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Money is a crucial, yet contested aspect of global development. This article focuses on the monetary 
flows connected to civil society organisations (CSOs). CSOs have traditionally been conceptualised at 
the bottom of vertical aid chains, exemplifying their dependence on international donors. The retreat 
of traditional donors from regions such as the Caribbean has the potential to alter the way CSOs 
operate and their engagement in development activities. Based on empirical research with CSOs in 
Barbados and Grenada this paper explores the perceived impact of donor withdrawal from the region 
and discusses three key strategies civil society groups employ in this context. The paper argues that 
despite feeling increasingly vulnerable, civil society groups are responding by continuing to creatively 
draw on diverse social, emotional and financial resources to manage this precarity. However, some of 
these efforts add to the insecurity felt by civil society groups further increasing their fragility. This paper 
then aims to add to the body of work that is re-evaluating different aspects of global development 
finance in changing financial times.
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Introduction
Money is recognised as an important component within the global development 
industry and can be used proactively to achieve desires and aims, but it also embodies 
insecurity, unpredictability and risk (Green et al., 2012). This article focuses on the 
monetary flows connected to one sector of  the development industry, civil society 
organisations (CSOs). CSOs have been projected as alternative avenues for devel-
opment, but also critiqued for not being effective development actors (Banks et al., 
2015; Bebbington, 2004; Edwards and Hulme, 1996). Despite these concerns, civil 
society groups remain important in the development arena, with significant amounts 
of  money flowing through them (DFID, 2016; OECD, 2008). Money is important 
for civil society work, and forms a substantial part of  the day-to-day challenges of  
sustaining civil society activity. Using empirical data from research with civil society 
groups in the Eastern Caribbean, this paper explores the perceived impact of  donor 
withdrawal from the region and discusses three key strategies that civil society groups 
employ to manage this precarity.
Managing precarity? Civil society 




The paper continues as follows. It begins by examining the literature on civil 
society groups and development financing. Dominant narratives project civil society 
groups as passive recipients of  development funding, but they are also starting to be 
reconceived as more active entrepreneurial agents within financial interactions. The 
paper then moves on to an empirically based discussion of  the everyday experiences 
of  Caribbean civil society actors, which demonstrates that civil society groups are 
feeling increasingly precarious due to reductions in donor support and are responding 
by continuing to draw creatively on diverse social, emotional and financial resources 
to manage this vulnerability. The paper concludes that some of  these efforts add to 
the insecurity felt by civil society groups, further increasing their fragility. This paper 
adds to the body of  work that is re-evaluating different aspects of  global development 
finance in changing financial times.
Civil society organisations: passive recipients of  
development financing
Significant amounts of  money flow through third sector organisations and civil 
society groups which are seen as important economic actors (O’Reilly, 2011). 
Connections between civil society and money have predominantly been conceptu-
alised through ‘Western’ viewpoints, which concentrate on international flows, aid 
and remittances, with less attention paid to the economic systems of  development 
that arise from the global South and how traditional aid systems are contested 
and negotiated (Pollard et al., 2009). Studies directed at civil society have concen-
trated on flows of  foreign aid and its effects (Bebbington, 2004; Kaag, 2011), the 
regulation and delegitmisation of  organisations associated with foreign funding 
(Dupuy et al., 2015), and professionalisation driven by the demands of  increasingly 
neoliberal donor agencies (Ahmad, 2003; Mawdsley et al., 2002). Donor funding 
is often seen as responsible for building particular civil society landscapes, and 
the aid system is considered a powerful force, shaping civil society in a number of  
complex ways including organisational formation, language spoken and program-
matic focus (Banks et al., 2015; Bebbington, 2004; Kamstra and Schulpen, 2015; 
Mawdsley et al., 2002).
CSOs are often conceptualised at the bottom of  the aid chain; they are reliant on 
foreign aid and the whims of  donors, with increasing pressure to be upwardly rather 
than downwardly accountable (Banks et al., 2015). This places NGO accountability 
firmly in the domain of  donors, and civil society as a subservient part of  the aid 
industry (Amagoh, 2015). CSOs can become primarily accountable to donors and less 
responsive to their constituents, decoupling groups from the communities they work 
with (Baillie Smith and Jenkins, 2011; 2012; Banks et al., 2015; Mawdsley et al., 2002). 
Focusing on the role of  the international donor downplays considerations of  the way 
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that money is negotiated, collected and used, the social processes involved and the 
agency and entrepreneurialism of  civil society actors.
This minimising of  civil society agency within development financing is also 
reflected in the spatialised discourses of  development, where the global North accepts 
and relishes responsibility for ‘developing’ an implicitly inferior global South (Noxolo, 
2006; Power, 2009). The divisions between North and South are problematic and 
have been critiqued for not reflecting the changing development landscape to incor-
porate relatively new development actors, such as China and Brazil (Mawdsley, 2013; 
2017), yet they remain regularly used development categories, with ‘traditional’ donor 
countries still wielding considerable power (Mawdsley, 2017).
Dominant narratives project civil society groups as passive recipients of  donor 
money, with concerns focused on how international donors shape organisational struc-
tures, roles and accountability. This is changing, aligned with alterations in traditional 
aid architecture, yet the importance of  alternative, non-Western economic spaces 
for civil society remains less explored, with less attention paid to civil society agency 
within financial interactions (see AbouAssi, 2012; 2014; Bebbington, 2004; Mawdsley 
et al., 2002 for exceptions). Following this line of  thought, the paper will now turn to 
consider how civil society groups are being reconceived as more active agents within 
development financing and how contemporary civil society financing connects to 
ideas of  entrepreneurialism.
Greater agency: a more entrepreneurial civil society within a 
changing development landscape?
The dominance of  the North/South divide and the prominence of  international 
donors as key development actors has more recently been challenged by transfor-
mations in international aid architecture. This includes the increasing prominence 
of  Southern donors and their attempts to shift discourses of  aid to more horizontal 
relations (de Renzio and Seifert, 2014; Mawdsley, 2012; Quadir, 2013), greater domestic 
challenges in donor countries in terms of  economic prosperity and perceptions of  aid, 
and the rise of  the private sector as an important development actor (Blowfield and 
Dolan, 2014; Mawdsley, 2015; 2017; McEwan et al., 2017). Alongside the introduc-
tion of  these ‘newer’ actors, retreat of  ‘traditional’ donors has become a feature of  
the international development landscape (Hayman, 2012). Aid withdrawal has been 
considered in the context of  aid sanctions connected to particular political condition-
alities and demands, for example, improvement in human rights (Crawford, 1997; 
Neumayer, 2003). More recently, attention has been paid to shifting trends in aid 
withdrawal associated with the changing economic status of  both recipient and donor 
countries, accentuating a tendency to reduce foreign aid to many emerging economies 
(Dubochet, 2012; Hayman, 2012).
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With a concern about reduced financial resources, particularly from ‘traditional’ 
international donors, civil society groups have responded by looking to governments 
for greater financial involvement (Huyse and de Bruyn, 2015) and engaging with what 
Mawdsley (2012) calls non-DAC donors, whilst others have dabbled in utilising social 
enterprise models (Cieslik, 2016; Hailey and Salway, 2016), corporate donors (Mendonca 
et al., 2016) and international philanthropy (Hay and Muller, 2014).1 This dovetails with 
the encouragement of  entrepreneurial attitudes in development processes and indeed 
wider society. This spirit of  entrepreneurship is intimately connected to neoliberal modes 
of  governance, with Scharff (2016, 108) claiming that ‘the neoliberal self  is an entre-
preneurial subject’, extending neoliberalism from an economic practice to a subjective 
experience (Freeman, 2014; Ilcan and Rygiel, 2015). The term entrepreneurial embodies 
a sense of  creativity, innovation, flexibility, self-governance and the individualisation of  
responsibility (Freeman, 2014; Scharff, 2016). Entrepreneurialism is also associated with 
interactions with the market, risk taking and the development of  new ideas (Mack, 2016; 
McFarlane, 2012; Roberts, 2010).
The production of  the (social) entrepreneurial subject is increasingly becoming a 
focus for development interventions (Dolan and Rajak, 2016; Walker et al., 2008), with 
civil society groups and NGOs encouraged to adopt entrepreneurial do-it-yourself  
attitudes (Galvin and Iannotti, 2015; McFarlane, 2012). These studies highlight the 
potential of  the entrepreneur to self-manage local development, with citizens taking 
greater responsibility for their own development, removing responsibility from the 
state (McFarlane, 2012; Thieme, 2015). The creation of  young entrepreneurs in 
informal economies aims to harness the improvisation and dynamism present in these 
circumstances and transform it into engagement with inclusive market-based econo-
mies (Dolan and Rajak, 2016; Thieme 2015; 2017).
Whilst less attention has been paid to civil society finances away from international 
donor funding, one way in which civil society actors are becoming more entrepre-
neurial in their work is through the increased adoption of  social enterprise models 
of  working and the use of  institutional models and cultures drawn from business 
management (Cieslik, 2016; Edwards, 2014; Galvin and Iannotti, 2015; Roberts, 
2010). With this comes charges of  elitism and the social economy on which it is based 
presents both opportunities and threats for civil society (Cieslik, 2016; Edwards, 2014). 
Shifting from a non-governmental structure to a social enterprise model highlights 
the individual as the agent for change, with the few influencing the many (Galvin 
and Iannotti, 2015; McFarlane, 2012; Thieme, 2015). This sense of  entrepreneurship 
is also associated with the privatisation and individualisation of  responsibility and the 
importance of  increasing resilience rather than agitating for political change (Ilcan 
1 The DAC (Development Assistance Committee) is part of  the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), with the majority of  its member states drawn from Europe, North America and Austral-
asia. Non-DAC donors are donor countries outside of  this group.
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and Rygiel, 2015; McFarlane, 2012); a discourse that reduces the importance of  public 
institutions for social provision, encouraging autonomy, market-based problem solving 
and the individualisation of  failure (Ilcan, 2009; Ilcan and Rygiel, 2015).
Civil society groups are increasingly being considered as more active agents within 
development financing, particularly in the context of  a changing aid architecture and 
increasing emphasis on the importance of  entrepreneurial attitudes within develop-
ment processes. In one sense, the drive towards entrepreneurship promotes ingenuity, 
agency and creativity, but this optimism neglects the complexities associated with 
the entrepreneurial, including the potential for entrepreneurial attitudes to further 
depoliticise civil society and limited considerations of  the social relations in which 
entrepreneurship takes place (Cieslik, 2016; Thieme, 2015).
Context and methodology: civil society and sustainable 
development in Barbados and Grenada
This paper is drawn from a wider collaborative research project that explored the role 
of  CSOs working in the sustainable development field in Barbados and Grenada. 
Located in the Lesser Antilles group of  islands, Grenada has a population of  110,694 
(July 2015 estimate, CIA, 2016a) and is a member of  the Organisation of  Eastern 
Caribbean States. Barbados, with a population of  291,495 (July 2016 estimate, CIA, 
2016b) is often thought of  as a geographical and cultural outlier to the other Eastern 
Caribbean states. Barbados and Grenada share histories of  slavery and migration, 
colonial rule and independence struggles (Beckles, 2006; Brizan, 1984; Steele, 2003). 
Echoing other Caribbean nations, radical constitutional reform in the middle decades 
of  the twentieth century prompted the uptake of  universal suffrage, whilst the impact 
of  British colonial rule remains evident in the centralised political structures of  both 
islands. This is tempered by suggestions that the traditional ‘Westminster model’ of  
governance is not wholly appropriate for small island contexts (Bishop, 2011; Steele, 
2003).
Alongside much of  the wider Caribbean region, Barbados and Grenada are both 
economically and environmentally fragile. They experience significant economic 
volatility, with economies that are heavily reliant on precarious tourist industries, 
whose success is threatened by environmental vulnerability (Commonwealth Secre-
tariat, 2015a; 2015b; Wiltshire, 2015; World Bank, 2016). Despite this, both islands 
demonstrate high levels of  human development, with Barbados ranked marginally 
above Grenada on the Human Development Index (HDI), (UNDP, 2016a; 2016b). 
Whilst the importance of  these achievements is cause for celebration, continued devel-
opment on both islands is threatened by economic inequality, high unemployment, 
environmental fragility, cultural erosion and growing social inequalities (Bishop, 2010).
It is in this context that civil society groups are working towards sustainable develop-
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ment, incorporating a diverse range of  ideas, with activities including climate change 
adaptation, food and energy sovereignty and security, improving health and well-
being, and conserving the regions’ natural and built resources. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
the newly independent Caribbean was seen as a priority for states and non-govern-
mental institutions of  the USA, the UK and Canada, and civil society groups became 
recognised as important development actors in the region (Webson, 2010). Since then, 
however, CSOs have been criticised for: being inefficient development actors (Peters 
and McDonald, 2010), their financial ineptitude, limited community accountability 
(Ward, 2010), and becoming co-opted by the state (Girvan, 2012).
This paper is based on the responses of  civil society actors from groups based in 
Barbados and Grenada, forty-five of  whom took part in the project between September 
2015 and March 2016. The project sought to understand more about the everyday 
experiences of  civil society actors in this context. Participants were recruited delib-
erately via internet searches and snowball sampling. This resulted in semi-structured 
single encounter interviews with representatives from different civil society groups 
in Barbados and Grenada and occasional invitations to observe relevant activities. 
The research methodology also included ‘zooming-in’ on seven of  the participant 
organisations to focus on the details of  the lived experience of  civil society through 
repeat interviews and participant observation with these groups. Repeat interviewing 
was used as a way of  exploring in more depth the emergent themes arising from the 
interviews, developing rapport with participants and gaining a deeper knowledge of  
their stories and histories. These interviews were also complemented with participant 
observation in a variety of  settings and activities, aiming to look at civil society from a 
different angle and provide another perspective on day-to-day routines and activities. 
In this context, interviewing and participant observation were used together to build 
a more comprehensive understanding of  civil society.
The people who took part in the research were very often the founders or directors 
of  the civil society groups contacted. This situation evolved partly through deliberate 
sampling, in that the research was keen to understand the stories of  those who shape 
civil society and who make key decisions about civil society activity. Although people 
involved with civil society groups on a more informal or irregular basis may have 
perspectives on civil society that differ substantially from civil society leaders, this 
research project was keen to focus on people who are heavily engaged in civil society 
action. The involvement of  civil society leaders was also practical, in the sense that 
one or two individuals, who are supported on an ad hoc basis by other more transient 
members, dominate many groups in the Caribbean. Inevitably, this led to civil society 
founders taking part in the research, as they are the primary human resource for their 
organisation. In some of  the interviews the founders of  the organisation brought 
along another representative, often a key member of  the group.
The research gathered data from a wide variety of  CSOs, incorporating groups 
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of  different forms, working at a variety of  scales and through different types of  
engagement with sustainable development, aiming to get a sense of  the civil society 
activity associated with developmental concerns in Barbados, Grenada and the 
wider region. Although relatively small community-based groups dominate the civil 
society landscape in Barbados and Grenada, there is significant diversity between 
these groups, the activities they undertake and how they operate. Alongside these 
community-based groups, established CSOs operate at both the local and national 
level, for example, working on civil society activities in a particular locale, contrib-
uting to national policy forums and advocating to the government. Some civil society 
groups actively position themselves as organisations that support other civil society 
groups, build their capacity and advocate for the sector more widely. Despite this 
diversity, the majority of  participants in the research were from small community-
based groups with few full-time, paid staff. Thirty-three interviews were conducted 
with actors based in Barbados and twenty-six in Grenada, with interviews ranging 
from forty-five minutes to over two hours in duration. The majority of  interviews 
were conducted face-to-face at a location of  the participant’s choosing, with seven 
undertaken via Skype. In efforts to maintain anonymity and confidentiality I have 
used pseudonyms in this paper and also altered location names and other identifying 
details to aid the preservation of  organisational anonymity within the research. The 
interviews were audio-recorded (with permission) and transcribed by the author, with 
data coded and analysed manually.
Financial insecurity: the changing development landscape in 
the Eastern Caribbean
It is important to highlight the pertinent aspects of  the economic and development 
landscapes for civil society in the Eastern Caribbean, and the way that civil society 
actors perceive these environments. Over the last three decades, both Grenada and 
Barbados have transitioned from exported oriented agricultural economies with 
varying degrees of  success (Payne and Sutton, 2001). Barbados’s sugar monoculture 
has been replaced with an economic environment that is now dominated by the service 
industry, with tourism and offshore finance making significant contributions to foreign 
direct investment (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2015b). A similar situation is found in 
Grenada, where nutmeg has traditionally been a major source of  foreign exchange 
and employment, with the service industry again becoming central and Grenada 
embarking on a period of  ‘homegrown’ structural adjustment (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 2015a). High (Barbados) and upper middle income (Grenada) country 
status hide the volatility of  the both the Grenadian and Barbadian economies, associ-
ated with their exposure to external economic forces, environmental vulnerability and 
isolation (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2015a; 2015b; World Bank, 2016). It is within 
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these economic contexts that civil society experiences little financial assistance avail-
able locally, perceptions of  diminished contributions and increasingly difficult access 
to global funds.
The dominant literature on civil society has a tendency to position international 
aid as the primary space of  economic relations (Banks et al., 2015). Civil society 
groups in Grenada and Barbados have previously, and to some extent continue to, 
receive funding from a variety of  multi and bilateral donors, including Oxfam GB, the 
Commonwealth Foundation, Gesellshaft fur International Zusammenarbeit (GIZ, 
the German corporation for international co-operation), the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) and the European Union. Many civil society groups 
expressed concern about financial insecurity, often associated with donor retreat from 
the region. This trend was attributed to changing income status to middle and high-
income countries, the global recession making donor funding less available and the 
discursive way in which the region is no longer seen as a development priority. This 
can be contextualised within the changing global development landscape, particularly 
shifts in aid flows connected to economic transitions in both donor and recipient 
countries (Overton et al., 2013). These thoughts are illustrated in this excerpt from my 
conversation with Pam, the founder of  a civil society group in Grenada:
To describe what kind of  adjective I can use: humongous, unimaginable, unreal. It 
provokes significant discussion because the Caribbean I think had given so much and 
continues to give so much for the developed countries … I have to admit quickly 
without hesitation that the support that we’ve got in the 70s, late 70s, up until the 90s 
has been significant and has done tremendous for all countries, our human resources, 
our physical development. And I remember saying to an organisation in the UK 
actually, it’s like you’re punishing us because we used the resources to develop our 
people ... But I think by and large the Caribbean has come a long way from the images 
that is portrayed in terms of  fundraising and that’s what I call a punishment … I know 
that economies are struggling, I recognise that there is a lot of  poverty and vulner-
ability in developed countries. So against that background it has become a humongous 
challenge … In 2013 we had to just chop the staff because we just couldn’t pay people, 
we had a lot of  work but we can’t pay people and that kind of  situation was really, 
really, really very, very difficult emotionally and socially. It was my grays [referring to 
her hair] from that [laughs] trust me. My grays definitely came more out of  that. (Pam, 
founder Grenadian CSO, 1 February 2016)
Clare, an NGO practitioner in Barbados, spoke in a similar vein contending that:
One thing that has been developing in the Caribbean region is that many of  the islands 
in the Caribbean have been re-classified by the World Bank from low-income countries 
to high-income countries and that changes the donor perspective of  the region and 
interest in funding the region. But you know we are based on the ground, we know 
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that the GDP [gross domestic product] is improving, that doesn’t mean that every 
community is being affected and the wealth doesn’t rise across the board, so we still 
try to concentrate our programming and efforts in communities and countries and 
sectors that most need help … I would say that it’s good and bad that the country has 
moved from developing to developed. That’s good for the country in terms of  perspec-
tive from tourism and its global image but it’s … there’s still the need to help, and 
that restricts some of  the donor funding that’s available. (Clare, Director Caribbean 
regional NGO based in Barbados, 7 October 2015)
Pam and Clare illustrate the perceptions of  many civil society groups; that there is a 
temporality to the changes in international funding, with adequate support available 
from the 1970s through to the 1990s, which has been heavily reduced. Clare elabo-
rates further on the temporal shift towards reduced funding to the Caribbean region, 
explicitly connecting these changes to alterations in Caribbean country classification. 
These categorisations present another way through which to imagine and differen-
tiate between nation states, one that directly influences how development is articu-
lated, operationalised and financed.
These perceptions are echoed by data on aid to the Caribbean region, with both 
Barbados and Grenada showing a general trend for reductions in net official develop-
ment assistance (ODA) received between 1983 and 2010 (World Bank, 2018). USAID 
statistics demonstrate that foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean 
declined in the 1990s, returned to an upward trajectory in the 2000s as many countries 
in Central America received reconstruction assistance following Hurricane Mitch in 
1998, and declined again more recently following the global financial crisis and devel-
opmental changes in the region (Meyer, 2018).
Viewing aspects of  civil society work as vulnerable and insecure is relatively neglected 
within development studies, as Baillie Smith and Jenkins (2017) point out, vulnerability is 
usually associated with the beneficiaries of  development aid rather than those who are 
actively embedded in the development industry. Being part of  the global development 
industry, in this case as civil society actors, produces its own vulnerabilities and insecuri-
ties (Baillie Smith and Jenkins, 2017), particularly in the changing financial context. In 
my conversation with Pam quoted above, she exemplified the insecurity felt by many 
civil society groups, tracing the impact the reduction in development financing has had 
on her organisation, and articulates the anxiety, emotions and even bodily changes that 
have occurred as her group has found it progressively more difficult to acquire funding 
from international sources. The majority of  civil society actors interviewed voiced 
their concerns about these reductions in international funding and many organisations 
have started to adopt strategies to offset these financial pressures. Civil society groups 
are, therefore, responding to this vulnerability in an effort to secure their position and 
continue the work that they do. The paper will continue by discussing three key mecha-
nisms through which civil society groups make themselves more resilient to financial 
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uncertainty and sometimes even harness this financial precarity. Firstly, CSOs create 
diverse financial networks, secondly they build their reputation and finally CSOs are 
reframing self-sustainability as an opportunity.
It is important to note that CSOs have not always adopted these strategies purely in 
response to the changing donor landscape. Rather, the perceived reduction in donor 
funding has been a significant driver in their adoption and places greater pressure on 
the success of  these alternative financial mechanisms for civil society sustainability.
Being accountable: negotiating diverse financial networks
Almost all of  the civil society groups interviewed articulated the importance of  
developing more informal and entrepreneurial mechanisms to sustain their finances. 
Civil society groups are using the market to generate income, providing consultancy 
and administrative services, encouraging diaspora and philanthropic donations, 
taking part in a ‘barter’ style economy where knowledge and labour are traded in 
a non-monetary way, and using self  and family financing. These financial arrange-
ments are not discrete but are engaged with simultaneously and alongside the more 
formalised circuits of  international donors. This diversity was not restricted to certain 
groups; rather it is something that is common to many of  the research participants.
The way that civil society groups craft these diverse financial networks is exempli-
fied in this commentary from one of  the research participants, Colin, the founder 
of  a Barbadian CSO. In order for Colin to develop his community organic farm in 
a deprived suburban area of  Barbados he had to establish circuits for the transmis-
sion of  financial capital into (and out of) his project. Initially he reached into his own 
pocket, just to get things started. About four months later ‘a friend came by, told us 
about the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and that was how we 
got our first project’ (Colin, founder Barbadian CSO, 26 September 2015). Colin also 
obtains other flows of  financial capital through multiple sources, firstly through the 
market:
What we’re doing now, which is to be self-sufficient, is to get some money coming in 
from the crops that we’re putting into the ground … we’re taking the next two or three 
months as a growing period to get to that stage and we’re taking the next month to try 
and build a nursery so we can sell some seedlings so we can source some revenue … 
so we can consolidate with that. (Colin, founder Barbadian CSO, 26 September 2015)
Colin also actively sought out donations from the private sector including from 
an electrical company and a financial services company, emphasising here the impor-
tance civil society groups place on making and maintaining personal connections:
Sagicor [a financial services company], we told them, you know one of  our recurring 
costs every month is irrigation so they’re going to put us in their budget for next year 
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… You’ve gotta reach out though. You have to actively; I’ve got a list I call on. You’ve 
gotta follow up, you’ve got to follow up. You’ve got to leave some time each week for 
correspondence and for callings. (Colin, founder Barbadian CSO, 9 October 2015)
Colin’s example articulates the importance of  multiple financial flows to many civil 
society groups. Civil society groups, like the one Colin is involved in, are constructing 
a number of  financial networks connecting civil society, their friends, the market, the 
private sector and a multi-lateral donor.
These complex networks were not unusual, with many participants outlining their 
financial reliance on strategic connections with others. The sense of  multiple connec-
tions does not assume horizontal relations without power differentials; rather it shows 
the diverse financial relations within which civil society work is entangled. These 
networks also extend across national borders, incorporating diaspora groups and 
crowd-sourced funds from interested individuals overseas, challenging the traditional 
Eurocentric North-South binary prevalent in development discourses (Mercer et al., 
2009). Here civil society actors are going beyond the vertical relations and uneven 
geographies more usually associated with development finance and crafting their own 
financial networks (Noxolo et al., 2012).
One key aspect of  these more informal financial circuits is the importance civil 
society groups place on accountability within them. Financial accountability within 
civil society scholarship has predominantly been conceived within the realm of  donor-
led processes, with CSOs becoming increasingly divorced from their local constituents 
(Baillie Smith and Jenkins, 2011; 2012; Banks et al., 2015). Many civil society groups are 
developing processes to ensure accountability to different donors and devising alter-
native modes of  demonstrating financial responsibility. This accountability to others 
within their financial circuits extends into the actions and practices of  civil society, 
with informal financial circuits driving civil society to develop their own forms of  
regulation and accountability mechanisms, as Trevor and Pam, CSO founders, illus-
trated when talking about how their groups are devising accountability mechanisms 
for the diaspora and private sector contributions:
The accountability is very, very important because … you know what happens in 
several organisations you send food or money and there is not accountability and 
you keep it for yourself  … lt is very, very important to us and that is why Facebook 
is also important, how do we keep in touch with them … Even myself  when … I 
travel I make sure I arrive early. If  I go to New York I see the people there and say 
this is what we’ve been doing, this is what’s happening. (Trevor, founder Grenadian 
CSO, 7 March 2016)
It [referring to the donations] comes from individuals like a past principle of  a school, 
so it comes from professionals but it comes largely from the private institutions, the 
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banks, the electricity companies, your credit unions … We try hard to practice what we 
preach so we provide them with reports I mean a letter goes every year soliciting their 
support but it goes with content [about the programme] … and … in addition to that 
we send out an unaudited financial report … So I think that has built confidence … 
and people say I know that programme so the private sector’s confidence is very well 
placed from that. (Pam, founder Grenadian CSO, 1 February 2016)
These two examples show how civil society groups are being creative and 
crafting networks of  accountability that are very different from those prescribed to 
them through dominant methods of  development finance. Civil society groups are 
not powerless in crafting their own financial networks, and have developed systems 
of  regulation that deviate from the project plans and budgets utilised by interna-
tional donors. There is agency for civil society actors in how they develop appro-
priate accountability mechanisms within their financial networks, challenging the 
often-Eurocentric nature of  development financing and assumptions that civil society 
groups are only upwardly accountable to international donors. These relations are 
not about vertical dependency relations; they project a more horizontal version of  
accountability, in Trevor’s example through Facebook or his personal mobility. The 
development of  these different accountability mechanisms allows civil society to be 
responsible to their donors in a way that is not forced on them from ‘outside’. Trevor 
is able to use his own skills and knowledge to develop avenues for accountability that 
feel more relevant for their civil society work. This emphasises the agency, creativity 
and entrepreneurial spirit of  civil society groups in forming these networks.
Maintaining your reputation
The second strategy adopted by civil society groups to manage their financial vulner-
ability is perhaps most often associated with the tenets of  entrepreneurship; the ability 
to craft an individual brand with a ‘unique selling point’ (Scharff, 2016). The success 
of  individual civil society actors in obtaining money is often reliant on their reputa-
tions, as well as the social connections and the knowledge they have at their disposal. 
This accentuates the importance of  individual actors developing and maintaining 
their own ‘brand’ and reputation to encourage donations. Civil society finance moves 
into the private domain of  the individual, with civil society actors viewing themselves 
as the visible product that people are investing in (Ilcan, 2009; Scharff, 2016). Alyson, 
the founder of  a Grenadian CSO, exemplified this idea as she explains here in refer-
ence to crowdfunding:
We realised people would come and help and crowdsourcing [is] a lot better than 
getting some hand up from some charity saying what our wants are … I don’t mind 
reporting on the use of  it and I don’t mind because I want to keep up our status to one 
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day get more ... I’ve got to maintain my presence, on LinkedIn on Facebook, people 
have to see who I’m connected to, read my reviews and then they’ll trust us and donate. 
(Alyson, founder Grenadian CSO, 5 February 2016)
Some civil society groups, such as Alyson’s, are actively using relatively new and 
innovative technologies to expand the geographies of  their financial inputs, with 
crowdfunding becoming an increasingly popular modality. Originally started as a 
form of  deriving startup capital for small businesses or as a way of  funding cultural 
projects (Langley, 2016), crowdfunding is now being considered by a number of  civil 
society groups as a viable source of  funding their work. Crowdfunding has the poten-
tial to foster new social ties and the potential to bring not only financial benefits 
but also broaden the reach of  the organisation, bring on board new associates and 
supporters, and to gain knowledge. It may also create a more democratic form of  
development financing, where the civil society group is directly accountable to the 
donor. There is a risk, however, that it could reproduce precarious and vulnerable 
social relations for civil society, and insecurity of  who they are, the skills they have 
and how they are being judged, this time seemingly on a more personal level. Rather 
than being about the project or the professionalism of  the organisation, the success or 
failure of  crowdfunding rests heavily on the shoulders on civil society founders. Civil 
society groups articulated that for crowdfunding to be successful, the leader of  the 
organisation must maintain a pristine reputation, both virtually and physically, to be 
able to attract donations, projecting the self  as a viable business (Scharff, 2016).
The majority of  the participants understood developing and sustaining their 
reputation as key to financial success. Civil society groups felt their reputation was 
shaped by how they engaged with different sources of  finance, with some groups 
using financial conduct as a form of  questioning and delegitimising other organisa-
tions. Here we can see that how civil society groups engage financially can legitimise 
and delegitimise their actions, as Pip, the founder of  a Grenadian CSO, articulates 
comparing his organisation to others:
My organisation never got any significant money from anybody because we always had 
this challenge of  not receiving money from any [environmental] destroyer, where as 
other organisations … they didn’t have that problem. They could have taken money, 
when we told them that one time we couldn’t take it, they didn’t understand. (Pip, 
founder Grenadian CSO, 27 February 2016)
Developing a particular brand for their civil society work and maintaining their 
reputation within financial endeavours was seen as crucial by many civil society 
groups. Civil society actors are also aware of  the importance of  developing a brand 
in order to enhance their financial resources. This is juxtaposed with insecurity and 
vulnerability, as Alyson explained above. There is a tension within the realm of  finan-
cial responsibility for civil society; in one sense they are increasing their agency and in 
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another there is the risk of  individualisation of  responsibility, reliant on projections of  
particular identities and reputations (Edwards, 2014; Ilcan, 2009).
Reframing self-sustainability
The processes of  adopting diverse economic networks and maintaining one’s reputa-
tion are two ways in which civil society actors resist the vulnerability associated with 
financial uncertainty. It would be easy to see the use of  these diverse economies 
as solely a response to the existential threat of  less donor money, considering the 
loss of  financial opportunities described earlier, but the multiplicity in civil society 
finances can also be understood as an opportunity to change the way that devel-
opment is enacted. This change is underpinned by a desire for independence and 
greater autonomy. For many civil society groups, crafting their own financial networks 
challenges the power-geometries of  development systems and the parent-child model 
of  financing, and places greater responsibility for financial attainment in the hands 
of  civil society actors (Noxolo, 2006; Power, 2009). Civil society groups frame the 
development of  multiple economic circuits as a way of  effectively contributing to 
sustainable development. They see money as an extension of  Western hegemony in 
development processes, and as a space of  quiet contestation to challenge the power-
geometries associated with development financing. As Timothy, the chief  executive of  
a Grenadian CSO, commented:
It still smacks of  ... it smacks of  ... it can be patronising. It can be extremely patronising, 
it’s almost like you know, it’s the whole Red Indian thing. Look a white man’s magic and 
you know for some of  us who have lived abroad, we said don’t come, please don’t come 
patronising, throwing something at ... throwing some shackles at people … They’ll 
look at it and think that’s a lot of  money but actually if  it’s not efficient, it can do more 
damage, because what you get is a lot of  failed projects and the next project that comes 
in is tarred with the same brush before its even started. Oh here we go again. (Timothy, 
chief  executive Grenadian CSO, 2 February 2016)
Many civil society actors use money to negotiate the dominant neo-colonial 
doctrines implicit in international donor money and the perceived reduction of  their 
own agency in their work, rejecting and disconnecting themselves from the inequali-
ties embedded in international aid (Noxolo et al., 2012). In Timothy’s quote, we can 
see how he feels that international aid has denied Southern development actors of  
agency and subdued their creativity. He shows how power flows through money, the 
use of  the word shackles implies the way development aid can restrict and restrain 
civil society actors, juxtaposing the power of  aid with the powerlessness of  recipients 
(Noxolo et al., 2012). Lincoln, the founder of  a Barbadian CSO, explained:
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Now we’re raising our own money to help us… and what it helps to do is to build your 
own capacity because you’re now thinking differently, managing your organisation 
differently, it forces you to manage differently … If  you want to be able to speak freely 
you must have your own power base, you must have your own income, you have to have 
your own independence because if  people are giving you they expect you to tow their 
line. (Lincoln, founder Barbadian CSO, 9 October 2015)
Here Lincoln articulates the thoughts of  many civil society actors, connecting the 
ability of  civil society groups to raise their own money with transitions of  power. He 
speaks of  being able to think and manage differently with their own sources of  money, 
of  being able to build his group’s capacity, and again connects international aid with 
the strangulation and constraint of  civil society work. Some civil society actors actively 
chose to remove themselves from the international donor system and this rejection 
of  international aid makes an attempt at challenging the hegemonic power-geome-
tries associated with this type of  funding, turning to an innovative mechanism such 
as crowdsourcing attempts to shift power to communities to organise themselves, 
challenging who decides how development is enacted (Massey 2004; Raghuram et 
al., 2009).
Civil society actors connected this desire to move away from institutional donor 
funding with greater emphasis on ‘locally’ driven mechanisms, where decisions are 
made about what development might entail by civil society actors themselves and 
actions driven by perceptions of  local need. Lincoln’s statements above articulate the 
importance of  decision-making and organising at a local level, something that feels 
restricted within the realm of  international funding. Civil society groups also felt that 
diversifying their financial arrangements has the potential to bring them closer to 
those they seek to represent, as Liam, the founder of  a Grenadian CSO, illustrated:
It has recently occurred to me that having no funds may be useful because everyone 
expects NGOs to have lots of  money to throw at cocktail parties and mini banquets 
and if  we say look we’re doing this with no funds no benefits to ourselves it may be that 
people listen to us more. (Liam, founder Grenadian CSO, 3 March 2016)
Seeking to move away from being solely reliant on international donor money, the 
adoption of  multiple funding mechanisms offers opportunities for civil society actors. 
It allows them to challenge the dominant power relations they feel are associated with 
international aid and the way that it restricts their activity and strangles their voice 
and creativity. There is a sense of  injustice about the way that aid replicates the racial-
ised hegemony of  colonialism, with alternative funding mechanisms offering potential 
to contest these relationships, nurturing agency and freedom for civil society actors in 
their work. The creation of  financial networks and the opportunities crafted by civil 
society actors through these relations challenges the dominant spatialities associated 
with international aid, contesting the dominance of  North over South and of  vertical 
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accountability (Raghuram et al., 2009). This challenges existing asymmetrical geome-
tries of  power within development discourse, ascribing a more active subjectivity to 
civil society actors (Massey, 2004; Noxolo et al., 2012; Power, 2009).
Conclusion
Civil society finances are comprised of  informal networks of  finance that are crafted 
intentionally by civil society groups. International donors and nation states have 
tended to dominate conversations about civil society finance, with responsibility for 
development situated in the global North. The changing development landscape, and 
in particular the retreat of  traditional donors from regions such as the Caribbean, 
places greater emphasis on the need to consider how civil society groups gain money 
beyond these dominant sources and what these processes tell us about the role of  civil 
society within development. Civil society groups are responding to changes in the 
donor landscape in three key ways by: actively creating diverse financial networks to 
sustain their work; reframing their thoughts on self-sustainability; and emphasising 
the importance of  maintaining their reputations. By listening to the everyday experi-
ences of  civil society actors, the burden they experience to finance their work and the 
way obtaining money is embedded in their everyday lives, this research demonstrates 
that civil society actors can no longer be viewed as passive subjects within financial 
processes. This contributes to a change of  identity for civil society actors, projecting 
them as agentic and entrepreneurial.
Civil society actors are creating their own diverse and informal financial networks 
as part of  their work, striving, as Noxolo et al. (2012) articulate, to form their own 
networks, histories and identities. Informal funding sources are thought to offer more 
opportunities to work in ways that are not connected to international donor agendas 
set outside of  the country. Even when there is not an outright rejection of  interna-
tional donor money, civil society actors create relational arrangements to rework the 
way that this money drives development. These mechanisms embed civil society more 
substantially within the local and transnational social fabric. They are more reliant on 
the success of  local business, the conditions of  the local market or diaspora connec-
tions. The informality of  financial arrangements means the financial responsibility for 
civil society rests more heavily within the relational networks of  particular civil society 
actors and the contextual economic and social environment of  the Caribbean.
Financial diversity explicitly challenges the unequal power-geometries embedded 
within international donor funds, and the paternalism that is felt through these 
methods, with alternative sources of  funding seen as an opportunity to reclaim 
moments of  power within development processes. These acts of  quiet contestation 
confront the narratives of  the ‘first world’ being constructed through its ability to 
effectively and successfully develop the ‘third world’ (Noxolo, 2006). Diverse financial 
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sources also offer potential for the development of  different forms of  accountability.
Civil society activity in the context of  donor withdrawal is not limited to the 
Caribbean region (see for example INTRAC, 2018) and the research on which this 
paper is based suggests that financial models for development need to incorporate 
discourses of  a more agentic civil society. This agency can be recognised within the 
context of  international donor funding through increased collaboration with CSOs 
during the grant-making process, greater acknowledgement of  the variety of  forms 
through which accountability can be demonstrated, and by increasing the availability 
of  smaller amounts of  funding for grassroots groups.
As this paper has argued international donors are only one (and potentially a 
declining) facet of  financial support for CSOs. Within the global models of  develop-
ment finance it is increasingly important to acknowledge the diversity of  financial 
sources that many CSOs utilise and to move towards models that value and inter-
rogate these less traditionally dominant forms of  financial support. This variety, 
however, should be seen in the context of  continued vulnerability. These shifting 
financial arrangements should not be seen as a panacea to civil society’s funding 
dilemmas. Rather they are part of  a set of  processes that need to be critically reflected 
on by both civil society activists and those ‘outside’, inevitably asking questions about 
the role and influence of  donor agencies. Informality and diversity do not necessarily 
preclude marginalisation. Accusations of  the apolitical nature of  civil society caused 
by international donor funding are not necessarily overcome through diversification, 
as the reputation, identity and social resources these channels rely on can be politi-
cally precarious. Voices marginalised through international donor money can also be 
side-lined through an inability to build informal sources of  funding, particularly if  
they lack social bonds, capital and resources, which underpin the creation of  many 
informal financial networks, potentially limiting the ways in which civil society groups 
in Barbados and Grenada, and elsewhere, can engage in sustainable development.
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